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BEHIND THE VELVET CURTAIN: UNDERSTANDING 
SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS 
THROUGH JUSTICES’ PERSONAL CONFERENCE NOTES 
Ryan C. Black* 
Timothy R. Johnson** 
I. INTRODUCTION
In late June 2012, Chief Justice Roberts shocked legal and 
political analysts alike by voting to uphold the constitutionality 
of the Affordable Care Act.1 Conservatives, who generally 
opposed the ACA, were so startled by Roberts’s unexpected 
decision that some even called for his impeachment.2 Just days 
later, fuel was added to the fire when longtime Supreme Court 
reporter Jan Crawford broke the news that the Chief Justice had 
switched positions in the case. According to Ms. Crawford, who 
cited “two knowledgeable sources,” at the conference vote that 
followed oral arguments he and the rest of the conservative bloc 
were prepared to strike down the constitutionality of the so-
called individual mandate.3 However, the Chief Justice 
eventually switched his vote and sided with the liberal bloc to 
uphold the ACA, albeit on narrow grounds. 
*Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, and faculty affiliate with the 
Michigan State University College of Law. 
**Morse-Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Political Science and Law, 
Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2010); see
also Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding most components 
of ACA constitutional).   
2. David Horsey, John Roberts Saves “Obamacare,” Enrages Tea Party Conservatives,
LATIMES.COM (June 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/29/nation/la-na-tt-john 
-roberts-20120628 (referring to “incensed conservatives . . . printing up ‘Impeach John 
Roberts’ T-shirts” and “a freshly minted ‘Impeach John Roberts’ Facebook page”). 
3. Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBSNEWS.COM
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224 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
While we now have some idea of what transpired behind 
the scenes in this highly salient case, possessing data of this 
nature is the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the rule is 
that what happens during the Court’s conference is usually kept 
absolutely private, even after a decision is made.4 As a result, 
because only the Justices are allowed in the Court’s conference 
room for these discussions, they are among the most secretive of 
all meetings that take place within the federal government. The 
system works so well that the Court has seldom experienced 
information leaks about how it will decide or about what 
transpires at conference. 
Certainly privacy is good for the Justices as it allows them 
to candidly express and discuss their positions on some of the 
nation’s most important legal and policy issues.5 What is good 
for the Court, however, is not always good for those who seek to 
understand why the Justices decided in a particular way—and 
how they reached their final decisions. In fact, scholars and 
Court watchers alike would surely have better understood why 
the Chief initially joined with his ideological allies to strike the 
ACA but then changed his vote if they had been privy to that 
initial conference discussion. More generally, such information 
would fundamentally alter our understanding of how decisions 
develop and how the Justices interpret the law because Court 
opinions are the culmination of a process that begins with debate 
at conference. As a result, our understanding of where policy 
ends is necessarily incomplete without knowing the Justices’ 
initial legal and policy positions explicated to their colleagues 
during conference discussions. 
While we do not have access to contemporaneous 
conference discussions, we can still learn much about how the 
Court develops law, policy, and legal standards from historical 
records. Many Justices who retired during the past half-century 
left their hand-written notes of what transpired during 
conference. These notes provide insights into how the Chief 
4. How The Court Works—The Justices’ Conference, S. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (n.d.), 
https://supremecourthistory.org/htcw_justiceconference.html (explaining that “[i]n a capital 
full of classified matters, and full of leaks, the Court keeps private matters private,” and 
that although “[r]eporters speculate . . . details of discussion are never disclosed, and the 
vote is revealed only when a decision is announced”).
5. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI.
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SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES 225
Justice, who speaks first, frames the legal and policy debate, 
how each associate Justice responds to this frame, and how the 
discussion about the legal and policy intricacies of a case 
proceeds. 
Here we provide the first step towards understanding what 
transpires during the Court’s private conference discussions. 
Using a sample of conference notes transcribed by Professor 
Dickson,6 we analyze how Justices interact with one another 
during conference and how such interactions affect the degree to 
which Justices take part in writing the majority or separate 
opinions after conference. 
We proceed as follows. In the next section we provide a 
broad overview of how conference discussions transpire at the 
Court. We then explore the (rather small) literature that has 
considered conference from a social-scientific perspective. Next, 
we describe and explore the data that we analyze here. We 
conclude by describing the broader data we use for our 
SCOTUS Notes project, how we will analyze these data, and the 
state of our data-collection efforts. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE MECHANICS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFERENCE
After hearing oral arguments in each case on the Court’s
plenary docket, the Justices hold conference to discuss the legal 
and policy questions of each case and to cast their initial votes. 
Discussion within conference begins with the Chief Justice, who 
presents his perspective on the facts of the first listed case.7
From there he offers his personal view of the case and then casts 
his vote.8 When the Chief Justice is done speaking, the associate 
Justices offer their views and votes in descending order of 
seniority.9
Three features of the Court’s conference make it distinctive 
and important for analysis. First, these proceedings are the first 
time the Justices take direct action on how to decide cases they 
6. See DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 1940–1985: THE PRIVATE 
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (Del Dickson ed. 2001). 
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226 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
hear.10 This makes analysis of conference particularly significant 
because, oftentimes, the first discussion in a decision process is 
the most critical.11 Second, conference votes and stated legal or 
policy positions are non-binding. In fact, we know that at least 
one Justice changes positions in more than a third of all cases 
the Court decides.12 Being able to identify a Justice’s initial 
position in a case, therefore, is key to accurately determining 
when and why a Justice subsequently joins a coalition or 
switches positions later in the process. Third, and most 
important for our long-term project, Justices conduct 
conferences in private with only the nine Justices allowed in the 
room for these discussions.13
Given the norm of privacy about conference discussions, 
only the Justices and the law clerks and secretaries they work 
with know what transpires during these proceedings. However, 
clerks and secretaries are bound by an oath of secrecy that 
virtually all take very seriously.14 As a result, the only source of 
systematic data about conference is the papers left by retired 
Justices. These papers allow us to recreate the nature of the 
discussion that sets the stage for the Justices’ ultimate decisions. 
Consider Figures 1A and 1B, which together provide an 
example to demonstrate the richness of information these 
documents contain. The figures reproduce the two pages of 
notes taken by Justice Blackmun in the conference for Texas v. 
Johnson,15 a case involving freedom of speech and the right to 
burn an American flag. These pages reveal that the Justices 
10. The Justices hold closely to the norm of not discussing cases prior to conference. 
See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL 
ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE 
DIALOGUE 7–8, 14 (2012) (indicating that the Justices indirectly “discuss” cases through 
their questioning during oral argument, but that initial votes and dispositive position taking 
do not happen until conference). 
11. See generally Kenneth Bettenhausen & J. Keith Murnighan, The Emergence of 
Norms in Competitive Decision-Making Groups, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 350 (1985). 
12. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting 
Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 587 (1996) (reporting that 
“[d]uring the Burger Court, at least one justice changed positions in 36.6% of the cases, 
while individual justices switched their votes 7.5% of the time”).
13. E.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 253 (rev’d & updated ed. 
2001). 
14. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE 
MODERN SUPREME COURT vi–vii (2005) (describing commitment to “absolute secrecy”). 
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SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES 227
engaged in a great deal of substantive discussion about 
protecting an individual’s right versus the state’s interest in 
protecting the flag as a symbol of the nation. More generally, 
these notes provide evidence of how conference unfolds. 
Figure 1A: Justice Blackmun’s Conference Notes, Page 1 
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Figure 1B: Justice Blackmun’s Conference Notes, Page 2 
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SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES 229
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over, and began, the 
deliberations. He called the case for discussion, presented his 
views on the issues involved (Justice Blackmun’s notes show 
that the Chief Justice believed that the “t stat is const”16), and 
ultimately voted to reverse in favor of Texas. From there, the 
remaining Justices stated their views and voted in order of 
seniority. 
Next, Justices Brennan and White spoke and made their 
views clear. Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that Justice 
Brennan suggested that flag burning is political speech, that 
states may not command respect for the flag, and that the law in 
question was too vague. Justice White, on the other hand argued 
that the Court would run FA (the First Amendment) into the 
ground. Ultimately, Justice Brennan cast a vote for Johnson 
while Justice White voted for Texas.17
According to Justice Blackmun’s notes, other Justices had 
more to say about the statute and issue they faced in Johnson.
He noted that Justice O’Connor found it to be an “[u]npleasant 
case,” but, as she cast a vote for Johnson,18 she suggested that 
offensiveness to others is not a standard the Court has ever 
approved. Justice Scalia indicated the case “makes me sick” 
while Justice Stevens thought the Court “S n hv taken—we lose 
either wa” and that the law is “n substantially OB, bec only US 
flag wd b protect.”19 Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that 
Justice Kennedy would vote for Johnson and, in so doing 
thought that the “flag wd b unscathed despite opin—may well be 
strengthened.”20
In such a highly salient case as Johnson, it is no wonder the 
Justices had much to say about how to decide on the merits.21 Of 
16. We keep Justice Blackmun’s notes in his shorthand so the reader can know exactly 
what he wrote. This notation translates to “thinks the statute is constitutional.” See Figure 
1A, supra page 227. 
17. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (indicating that Justice Brennan wrote the Court’s opinion 
holding that the First Amendment protected Johnson’s conduct), 421 (indicating that 
Justice White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion). 
18. See Figure 1B, supra page 228. 
19. Again, Justice Blackmun used his shorthand, but the translation is clear: “Should 
not have taken—we lose either way,” and “Not substantially overbroad, because only US 
flag would be protected.” See id.
20. “Flag would be unscathed despite opinion—may well be strengthened.” See id.
21. Justice Brennan’s notes on this case corroborate what Justice Blackmun saw 
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course, the level and intensity of discussion varies from case to 
case. In some (from the thousands of cases we have collected), it 
appears the Justices have very little to say—the Chief Justice 
presents his views and the rest simply note their agreement or 
disagreement with that view. In other cases, like Johnson, every 
Justice speaks about the legal issues and the ultimate decision 
the Court should make. This variation, although clearly 
important substantively, has yet to be examined systematically. 
Nor have scholars analyzed the downstream implications on the 
Court’s decisionmaking process of what transpires during 
conference. In general, these proceedings stand out as a 
woefully understudied area of scholarship about how Justices on 
the nation’s highest Court make decisions. 
III. CONFERENCE: EXISTING DATA AND KNOWLEDGE
Systematic scholarly accounts exist of almost every aspect 
of the Court’s decisionmaking process—from agenda setting,22
to briefing23 and oral arguments,24 to opinion writing and 
bargaining,25 to opinion announcements.26
The one part of the process that has been largely ignored, 
however, is its most secretive part: the Justices’ weekly 
conference at which they vote on agenda setting by voting to 
grant or deny petitions for certiorari and on the merits of cases 
that they hear. While studies have focused on conference 
22. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); H.W.
PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE (1991); Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, Selecting the 
Select Few: The Discuss List and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 94 
SOCIAL SCI. Q. 1124 (2013). 
23. See, e.g., Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants and Strategic Framing, 54 AM.
J. POLITICAL SCI. 617 (2010). 
24. See, e.g., BLACK ET AL., supra note 10; Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & 
James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 
AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 99 (2006). 
25. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
26. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan Black & Eve Ringsmuth, Hear Me Roar: What 
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SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES 231
votes,27 or on discussion in small samples of cases,28 to date 
there has not been a full-scale systematic account of what 
transpires during these proceedings. 
A key reason why conference has not yet received the same 
attention as other parts of the Court’s decisionmaking process is 
that only the Justices take part in these meetings. Nobody else is 
allowed in the conference room when they discuss cases—no 
security, no secretaries, and no clerks. This means, at least for 
the contemporary Court, that we know little about how the 
wheels of justice work at this stage of the process. 
Analyses of conference that do exist conventionally limit 
their analyses of Supreme Court conference to the Justices’ 
dispositional votes to affirm or reverse a lower court decision.29
This focus is largely predicated on practical concerns. That is, 
votes are predominantly dichotomous (i.e., affirm or reverse) 
and are clearly recorded on “docket sheets,” which are a single-
page voting records maintained by each Justice for every case 
the Court decides. Despite these advantages, focusing on votes 
has a critical drawback—they provide no information or context 
about why a Justice arrived at a given vote. This is a significant 
limitation because in the U.S., as in any common law system, 
the main contribution of any decision by the Court is typically 
not who won or lost but rather the legal rule contained within the 
written opinion.30 Moreover, there are often numerous legal 
justifications available for each possible disposition. In turn, 
Justices can and, as evidenced by the rise in concurring 
opinions, often do disagree about how the Court should go about 
reaching an agreed-upon dispositional outcome. 
27. See, e.g., Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 12, at 581; Jan Palmer & Saul 
Brenner, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations and the Conference Vote On-the-Merits on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 185 (1995). 
28. E.g., Knight & Epstein, supra note 5.
29. See generally, e.g., Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations 
and Chief Justice Vinson’s Vote on Certiorari, 18 AM. POLITICS Q. 68 (1990); Palmer & 
Brenner, supra note 27; Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? 
Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 421 (1996) (using 
conference votes in analysis of factors affecting Chief Justice’s opinion-writing 
assignments). 
30. E.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT 
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1 (2006) (recognizing that “Supreme Court decisions do not 
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Consider, for example, the 2015 decision in Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,31 in which the Court, by a vote of six to 
three, struck down part of a federal law and held that only the 
President (and not Congress) has the ability to recognize foreign 
states. In this case Justices Breyer and Thomas filed opinions 
that, although supporting the outcome of the majority, took issue 
with its legal justification. Justice Breyer believed the case to be 
inappropriate for the Court to adjudicate due to the political-
question doctrine.32 Justice Thomas, by contrast, agreed with the 
declaration of unconstitutionality but opposed Justice Kennedy’s 
assertion in the Court’s opinion that Congress has no power over 
naturalization laws.33
Much as in the 2012 ACA case, it will be some time before 
the private records of what transpired during the Court’s 
conference discussion in Zivotofsky are made public. But, we 
can conjecture that docket sheets in this case would simply 
indicate Justice Breyer as voting to affirm. That is, his vote 
would be, in the parlance of variable measurement, “pooled” 
with those of the other four Justices who voted, with no 
additional reservations, to affirm. This case illustrates 
poignantly the important gap that can exist between Justices’ 
dichotomous votes and their actual scope of preferences over 
legal policy. 
Conference notes, which record both votes and the 
justification for those votes, offer the only way to fill this gap 
and to recover the fullness of each Justice’s preliminary 
preferences in a case. In other words, conference notes can 
uniquely answer the important question of “why?” Despite this 
promise, practical considerations have prevented scholars from 
embracing the usefulness of conference notes. Both data 
collection and coding are resource intensive—especially in the 
type of empirical studies conducted by many scholars. Because 
of this barrier, even scholars who study aspects of the Court’s 
decisionmaking process that take place after conference have 
31. 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
32. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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been forced to ignore the substance of what takes place in 
conference.34
To make our contention about the importance of conference 
notes clear, we turn to controversial and highly influential 
research showing that a majority of Justices, in a majority of 
cases, do not adhere to the norm of stare decisis,35 and to equally 
influential research that mined Justice Brennan’s conference 
notes to rebut those claims.36 We believe that the latter analysis, 
although limited to nine cases, shows that what transpired during 
the Court’s conference in those cases provides compelling 
evidence that the Justices believe precedent matters. Indeed, 
Justice Brennan’s notes indicate that fully eighty-three percent 
of the comments made by the Justices during conference 
mention precedent. As Professors Knight and Epstein conclude, 
“[t]he very fact that precedent would be employed as a source of 
persuasion in their private communications suggests that the 
Justices believe that it can have an effect on the choices of their 
colleagues.”37 This conclusion strongly supports our general 
claim that Justices use conference to discuss issues that warrant 
serious attention and that are potentially dispositive in particular 
cases. It also highlights just how much scholars can learn about 
the Court by peering into the notes of a single Justice in a 
handful of cases. 
Another study conducted after the influential work of 
Professors Knight and Epstein using conference notes examined 
34. See, e.g., David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic, Choice and Majority Opinion 
Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POLITICAL SCI. 652 (1972); see
also MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 25; Clifford Carrubba, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. 
Martin & Georg Vanberg , Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions? 56 AM.
J. POLITICAL SCI. 400 (2012); Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and 
Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 276 
(2007); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion 
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 551 (2004); Maltzman & 
Wahlbeck, supra note 29; Saul Brenner, Strategic Choice and Opinion Assignment on the 
U. S. Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 35 W. POLITICAL Q. 204 (1982).  
35. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (interpreting study results as strong support for the attitudinal 
model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which treats Justices’ decisions as driven only by 
their personal ideological preferences). Professors Knight and Epstein conducted the 
research in Justice Brennan’s notes. See generally Knight & Epstein, supra note 5.
36. The Google Scholar citation counts for the Segal and Spaeth and the Knight and 
Epstein articles were, as of March 29, 2019, 311 and 294, respectively. 





      05/06/2019   10:22:20
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 42 Side B      05/06/2019   10:22:20
BLACKJOHNSONRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)  5/1/2019 11:16 AM 
234 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
how oral arguments influence the Court’s decisionmaking 
process. Professor Johnson determined in it that issues raised 
during oral argument were subsequently discussed by the 
Justices during conference.38 The key to both of these studies is 
that they were among the initial salvos in lines of research that 
resulted in overturning established conventional wisdom 
regarding law as a constraint on the Justices and the importance 
of oral argument in the Court’s decisionmaking process.39
Despite the lacuna of analyses about the Court’s conference 
discussions, we can still learn much about how the Court 
develops law, policy, and legal standards from historical 
records. Indeed, as we note in the introduction, many Justices 
who retired over the past half-century left hand-written notes of 
what they saw and heard transpire during conferences in which 
they were participants. These notes provide insights into how the 
Chief Justice, who speaks first, frames the legal and policy 
debate, how each associate Justice responds to this frame, and 
how the discussion about the legal and policy intricacies of a 
case proceeds. Here we turn to a first cut of these data to provide 
readers with a glimpse of conference discussions at the Court. In 
particular, we are interested in exploring the degree to which 
Justices interact with one another. 
IV. A FIRST CUT: ANALYZING THE DICKSON DATA
In an incredible solo effort, Professor Dickson gathered, 
transcribed, and provided editorial content for conference notes 
from the papers of eight Justices in just under 300 cases decided 
between 1940 and 1985.40 We used those data for a multi-angle 
assessment of the Justices’ conference behavior by treating the 
Dickson data as primary source material, digitizing the pages 
that provided his transcription of the notes and restricting our 
38. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2004) (reporting on research involving examination of 
conference notes of Justices Powell, Brennan, and Douglas, and oral-argument notes of 
Justice Powell, in seventy-five civil-liberties cases). 
39. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
JOHNSON, supra note 38. 
40. DICKSON, supra note 6. Dickson’s volume is one of the most under-appreciated 
resources in the area of law and courts. Indeed, he provided an unprecedented glimpse into 
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analysis to the 257 cases decided from the 1946 term onward.41
We then did some basic processing with the Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count program to count the total number of words 
spoken and other related quantities.42
We begin with how often Justices speak—in the aggregate 
as well as individually. The conventional wisdom is that each 
Justice speaks only once and then votes at the end of his or her 
comments. Figure 2 allows us to assess this wisdom, indicating 
that, while in the vast majority of cases each Justice speaks only 
one time (or perhaps not at all), there are cases in which 
discussion is much longer. Sometimes Justices engage in a 
prolonged back and forth. At the extreme are several cases in 
which the total of speaking turns was more than twenty-five. 
Multiple Justices clearly spoke multiple times during the 
discussion—a break in the norm that generally controls 
conference. We explore some of these outlier cases below. 
Figure 2: Total Speaking Turns for Justices at Conference, 1946–1985 
Certainly it is telling that there are cases—presumably 
highly salient ones—in which Justices speak more than once. 
Indeed, this goes against the admonition of former Chief Justice 
41. We chose this term because it marks the beginning of the Vinson Court and is the 
first term included in the Modern version of the Supreme Court Database, which is our 
source for data on case attributes. See Supreme Court Database—2018 Release 1, WASH. UNIV.
SCH. OF L., http://scdb.wustl.edu (providing dozens of useful case- and Justice-level variables). 
42. We used the 2015 Mac implementation of the program [hereinafter LIWC], which 
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Rehnquist, who suggested that conference discussions are hardly 
conversations because there is not enough time during them to 
discuss the nuances of every case.43 What we find, however, is 
variation in the extent to which Chief Justices allow discussions 
to go beyond each Justice’s first comments. Specifically, 
consider the data in Figure 3, which depicts the proportion of 
cases over three Chief-Justice eras in which there were more 
than nine speaking turns during conference discussions about a 
given case. 
Figure 3: Proportion of Cases with Nine or More Speaking Turns 
at Conference, 1946–1985 
This figure makes clear that there was much more 
discussion on the Warren Court than there was on the Vinson 
Court. In fact, over half of all cases from the Warren Court 
involved at least one Justice speaking multiple times during 
conference. These freewheeling conferences were cut in half by 
Chief Justice Burger when he took over the Court in 1969, 
which is contrary to conventional views of how he ran 
conference.44 Despite the unconventional view, it is clear that 
43. See REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 255 (explaining that each Justice “has done such 
work as he deems necessary to arrive at his own views before coming into conference,” 
and that conference is “not a bull session in which off-the-cuff reactions are traded, but 
instead a discussion in which considered views are stated”). 
44. Indeed, one scholar has stated of Chief Justice Burger that “[h]e imposed little 
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each Chief Justice covered in these data allowed some 
discussion, in some cases, beyond one comment per Justice. 
Understanding aggregate Court behavior is important as we 
draw a sketch of how Justices interact during conference. 
However, to have a clearer picture of the discussions it is 
equally (and perhaps more) important to understand the behavior 
of individual Justices during these proceedings. We turn in 
consequence to an assessment of how individual Justices act as 
they speak about individual cases. Figure 4 provides data on the 
numbers of words uttered by Justices (according to the notes 
taken by their colleagues) in the Dickson sample of cases. 
Figure 4: Individual Words Spoken during Conference, 1946–1985 
Most Justices are not overly loquacious during conference. 
Indeed, the median utterance length is just thirty-six words, 
which is roughly equivalent to a couple of sentences. At sixty-
two words, the mean word count is quite a bit higher, which is 
why we see such a pronounced skew in the figure above. 
Although the eye cannot help but be drawn to some of the 
extreme values on the horizontal axis, these are truly outlier 
values. Ninety percent of the data fall between the values of two 
and 199 words (i.e., the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles, 
respectively). Thus, although the number of speaking turns 
wished,” and that “[a]s a consequence, senior Justices often spoke multiple times before 
junior Justices were able to make their initial contribution, and often little was left to be 
said by the time the end of the queue was reached.” Joel K. Goldstein, Leading the Court: 
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suggests more back and forth than the literature would suggest, 
the speaker-level data show that these exchanges are quite brief. 
In general, Justices make their views known and cast their 
votes—with little fanfare and without extravagant justification. 
Consider Figure 1A, the first page of Justice Blackmun’s notes 
in Texas v. Johnson, which are representative of the findings 
shown in Figure 3. While the Chief Justice laid out the facts and 
his views, the other Justices did not add much before casting 
their votes. Certainly there is variation, and sometimes Justices 
used hundreds of words, but that is the exception, not the rule. 
In some ways, this should not be especially surprising: the 
Justices have all read the same briefs and heard the same oral 
argument. Thus, by the time they sit as a collegial body to 
discuss the case, everyone is equipped with a common language. 
Furthermore, to the extent Justices are stable in their 
preferences, the surprises that might require discussion are 
probably few. Justice Scalia, for instance, was unlikely to 
reiterate at each conference why he was taking an originalist 
position in a case involving constitutional issues. 
While the preceding figures and discussion bring us closer 
to understanding participation by each Justice in conference, we 
are not yet at an individual level. We turn to that level by 
providing data on median word count by Justice and by seniority 
during our time period. Consider the former first in Figure 5. 
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As with the previous figures, there is clear variation 
between the Justices’ penchants for speaking during conference. 
Measured in this way, Justice Frankfurter is the most talkative of 
the Justices. This is in keeping with his reputation as the 
intellectual of the Court during his tenure.45 Next come the 
several Chief Justices, which is intuitive given that Chief 
Justices speak first, lay out the facts of the cases (as they see 
them), and then present their views of the issues. 
At that point there is little indication that senior associate 
Justices speak more often than their junior colleagues. Indeed, 
Justices Stevens and Powell are near the top of the list, but 
neither is near the most senior during our analysis. Yet Justices 
Stewart and Brennan are near the top third, which is intuitive as 
both were near the most senior (and Justice Brennan became the 
most senior after Justice Douglas left the bench in 1975). 
To illustrate the way in which tenure affects the amount 
each Justice speaks during conference, Figure 6 shows the 
Justices by seat. Seat 1 is the Chief Justice, while seat nine is the 
most junior Justice to join the Court. 
Figure 6: Median Word Count by Speaking Order at Conference, 1946–1985 
45. See, e.g., JAMES W. VICE, THE REOPENING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: ON
SKEPTICISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 148–49 (1998) (reporting that “it was widely 
assumed that Frankfurter, with his brilliance and scholarship, would greatly influence and 
dominate the Court,” but noting as well that “the Court is not easily dominated,” that 
“Frankfurter remained too professorial toward his peers”  and that he “was quite candid 
about his trait of lecturing his colleagues,” referring in his diaries to “speaking in 
conference ‘rather at length,’ . . .  speaking ‘at some length,’ . . . speaking ‘at length,’ . . . 
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What is immediately evident is that the first two speakers—
the Chief Justice and the senior associate Justice—speak the 
most words at conference. This, as we indicate above, is 
intuitive. That is, the chief sets out the facts of each case and 
also presents his views and votes. When the most senior Justice 
is ideologically distinct from the chief (for example, Justice 
Douglas and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice Roberts) 
the senior associate Justice probably lays out the opposite view 
of the case in a strong manner. From there, it is evident that the 
remaining associate Justices speak much less than the first two 
speakers. The fourth Justice to speak, for instance, says roughly 
one-third of what either the Chief Justice or the senior associate 
Justice will say. Interestingly, however, the downward trend is 
not constant over the last half of the Justices. In fact, we see that 
the fifth and sixth Justices to speak are doing so at a level 
consistent with the third Justice. And, perhaps most interesting 
of all, the second-to-last Justice ends up being the third most 
verbose in terms of median words spoken. In short, although 
there is clear seniority effect at the very beginning of a case’s 
discussion, we see no clear evidence of a generalized pattern 
among the seven Justices who speak after the first two. 
Finally, we turn back from a Justice view of conference to 
the case level to give a final view of conference. Consider, first, 
Table 1, which explicates the top twenty cases in terms of total 
words spoken by the Justices. The vast majority of these cases 
are among the most salient (politically and legally) from the 
twentieth century: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 46
and Brown v. Board of Education47 both make the list, as do 
Brown II,48 Roe v. Wade,49 Sweatt v. Painter,50 Baker v. Carr,51
and Buckley v. Valeo.52
46. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (addressing extent of executive power).   
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (addressing legally sanctioned racial segregation in schools). 
48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (same). 
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (addressing abortion). 
50. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (addressing racial integration of state-funded law school). 
51. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (addressing state statutes apportioning state legislative 
districts). 
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (addressing limits on political contributions under Federal 
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Table 1 
Top-Twenty Cases: Total Word Count, 1946–198553
Words Case Name Term 
6461 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 1953 
5311 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1951 
2857 Scales v. U.S. 1960 
2822 Garner v. La. 1961 
2668 Yates v. U.S. 1956 
2654 Brown II 1954 
2444 Ariz. v. Cal. 1962 
2443 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. 1955 
2329 Sweatt v. Painter 1949 
2310 Baker v. Carr 1961 
2293 Bell v. Md. 1963 
2263 Roe v. Wade 1972 
2084 Buckley v. Valeo 1975 
1619 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan 1981 
1559 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 1981 
1537 Cox v. La. 1964 
1468 Bowsher v. Synar 1985 
1432 Maxwell v. Bishop 1969 
1425 Davis v. Bandemer 1985 
1374 Williams v. Ga. 1954 
A similar list emerges in Table 2, where we have the top 
twenty speaking turns by individual Justices during conference. 
However, while many of the same cases appear, the pattern here 
is that, in highly salient cases, several Justices dominate the 
discussion. Justice Brennan appears quite often, as does Justice 
Black. Potentially noteworthy is who does not tend to appear on 
the lists—the Chief Justices. As we saw earlier, a Chief Justice 
tends to speak more in a typical case than do the other Justices. 
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Yet only four of the top-twenty spots are occupied by Chief 
Justices, with Chief Justices Vinson and Warren both appearing 
twice. Chief Justice Burger never once cracks the top twenty. 
Indeed, one would need to go all the way down to the fifty-
fourth spot in our ranking to find him. (He earned that rank by 
speaking 352 words in Buckley v. Valeo.) 
Table 2 
Top-Twenty Conferences—Individual Word Count, 1946–198554
Words Justice Case Name Term 
1117 Vinson Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer 1951 
1086 Brennan Bowsher v. Synar 1985 
1084 Brennan Davis v. Bandemer 1985 
1067 Brennan Nixon v. Fitzgerald 1981 
1051 Frankfurter Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer 1951 
1041 Minton Brown v. Bd. 1953 
947 Brennan Grove City College v. Bell 1983 
936 Brennan Firefighters Local v. Stotts 1983 
814 Warren Bell v. Md. 1963 
812 Black Ariz. v. Cal. 1962 
767 Black Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer 1951 
730 Brennan Ore. v. Elstad 1984 
682 Warren Yates v. U.S. 1956 
675 Black Sweatt v. Painter 1949 
675 Frankfurter Brown v. Bd. 1953 
635 Vinson Brown v. Bd. 1953 
619 Black Brown II 1954 
610 Goldberg Bell v. Md. 1963 
599 Brennan Boston Firefighters Union Local 718 v. NAACP 1982 
581 Brennan Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp 1983 
Overall, even these basic descriptive summaries show a 
good deal of variation in the amount of discussion that takes 
place at conference and which Justices do the most speaking. 
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These are the first data, so far as we know, to paint a picture of 
what happens in these most secretive meetings. But to what end? 
We know that the key to the entire decisionmaking process is 
the legal and policy output produced in the Court’s opinions.55
In the next section we begin an accounting of how what happens 
during the conference influences the latter stages of that process. 
V. THE IMPACT OF CONFERENCE:
LEVEL OF DISCUSSION AND OPINION WRITING
We examine here the degree to which conference affects the 
Court’s opinion-writing process by merging our word-count data 
with the Supreme Court Database.56 We turn first to assignment of 
the majority opinion. Figure 7 shows the results of examining 
whether a Justice who voted with the majority wrote the majority 
opinion. The x-axis shows the words spoken by a majority-coalition 
member during conference.57 The y-axis shows the probability that a 
Justice in the majority coalition wrote the Court’s opinion. 
Figure 7: The Probability of Writing the Majority Based on 
How Much a Justice Speaks at Conference, 1946–1985 
55. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 4; LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992); Tracey E. 
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM.
POLITICAL SCI. REV. 323 (1992). 
56. See note 41, supra.
57. For the x-axis, we transformed the raw measure into the natural logarithm (which 
for the values 10, 100, and 1000 is 2.3, 4.6, and 6.9, respectively) to account for the skewed 
nature of the underlying data and reduce the impact of large values. The extreme variation 
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As Figure 7 makes clear, there is a positive relationship 
between how often a Justice speaks and the probability that she 
writes the majority. Justices who speak the most (logged) words 
have almost a thirty-percent chance of writing, while those who 
speak the least have less than a ten-percent chance. This is a 
significant difference, especially given the Chief Justices’ norm 
of opinion-writing equity.58 Such a norm should indicate that 
each Justice writes about eleven percent of all majorities. But 
being more active at conference can alter this probability, which 
may affect the policy and law that the Court sets. 
Of course, a Justice who speaks more often is also more 
likely to write a dissent in that case. Figure 8 drives home this 
point. Just as before, the x-axis shows the level of a Justice’s 
activity at conference. The y-axis now shows the probability that 
a Justice, conditional on casting a dissenting vote, ends up also 
writing a dissenting opinion (as opposed to just signing one). 
Here, too, we find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables. Being active in the initial 
discussion about a case makes Justices more likely to push back 
against a majority with which they disagree. In fact, Justices 
who speak the most have roughly a seventy-five percent chance 
of writing a dissent. In contrast, those who speak the least have 
just a fifty-five percent chance of writing a dissent.  
Figure 8: Probability of Writing a Dissent Based on 
How Much a Justice Speaks at Conference, 1946–1985 
58. E.g., MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 25, at 30–31 (describing 
change by Chief Justice Rehnquist from distributing opinion assignments equally by 
number to distributing opinion assignments equally by workload, which can take note of 
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Finally, we expect that when there is more total discussion 
among the entire Court at conference more total separate 
opinions will be authored by the Justices. That is, the individual-
level phenomenon we identify above will carry over into the 
aggregate. Figure 9 shows the results of this analysis. The x-axis 
plots the total number of words spoken at conference and the y-
axis shows the overall number of separate opinions filed in a case. 
Figure 9: Number of Separate Opinions Based on How Much a 
Justice Speaks at Conference, 1946–1985 
Consistent with the findings in the previous figures, this is 
indeed the case as well. When the most logged words are spoken 
at conference, we expect to see, on average, just over two and a 
half separate opinions written in a case. However, as Justices say 
less, the number of opinions drops to just over one per case. This 
may have something to do with the level of controversy in a 
case, or the fact that the Justices speak much less when they 
agree more—both at conference and as they decide whether to 
write separately. 
VI. NEXT STEPS: PROJECT SCOTUS NOTES
A. The Dickson Data and Their Limitations 
The foregoing demonstrates the value of providing a 
systematic study of Supreme Court conference. We were only 
able to do so because of the tremendous and painstaking efforts 
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of entry for those who want to systematically examine Supreme 
Court conference discussions. It is clear that Justices have 
important discussions during these proceedings and that ample 
variation exists, both in terms of how much Justices say and the 
various factors that explain this variation. Why, then, has it 
taken nearly two decades for someone to shed even the faintest 
glimmer of light on such a significant data source? 
Arriving at a definitive answer is, of course, impossible, but 
we have some hunches. In particular, we believe that two 
aspects of the Dickson data have limited their usefulness to 
empirical studies. 
1. Narrow in Scope 
Consider, first, the scope of cases included. During the 
terms Dickson covers (1940 through 1985), the Supreme Court 
released just under 6100 opinions (either signed or per curiam) 
in its orally argued cases.59 All told, however, fewer than five 
percent were transcribed and included in his volume.60 The  
Dickson data are a sample. Of course there is nothing inherently 
wrong with samples and they often make feasible otherwise 
impossible analyses. However, the sample must be 
representative of the underlying population about which we wish 
to learn. This leads to the second and more significant limitation 
of the Dickson data—the several ways in which the sample of 
transcribed cases is unrepresentative. Here we highlight three 
factors on which meaningful differences exist: subject matter, 
case divisiveness, and media salience. 
59. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 88–89 (6th ed. 
2015) (tabulating relevant data in Table 2-8: “Signed Opinions, Cases Disposed of by 
Signed Opinion, and Cases Disposed of by Per Curiam Opinion, 1926–2013 Terms”). 
60. This was still a tremendous amount of effort on Professor Dickson’s part, however, 
in terms of time required—a fact we appreciate more and more with each day we work on 
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2. Unrepresentative of the Whole 
a. Case Subject Matter 
During the 1946 to 1985 terms (the Vinson, Warren, and 
Burger Courts) the Court issued 5777 opinions that appear in the 
Supreme Court Database with an identified substantive issue 
area.61 During these terms, at the population level, fifty-two 
percent of cases involved civil liberties (First Amendment rights 
and privacy, for example),62 twenty-five percent dealt with 
economic activity or unions; and  fourteen percent were about 
questions of judicial power (issues of comity or justiciability, for 
example).63 As for what cases ended up appearing in the 
Dickson transcription, however, there are significant differences. 
Civil liberties cases account for an overwhelming eighty-six 
percent of the Dickson data sample, whereas economics and 
judicial-power cases combined represent only ten percent. More 
generally, we can say that a systematic relationship exists 
between a case’s substantive issue area and whether it was 
selected for inclusion by Professor Dickson. 
b. Case Divisiveness 
Across the same 5777 decisions, the Court’s vote was 
minimum-winning (a five-to-four vote) about fourteen percent 
of the time. However, twenty-eight percent of the cases in the 
Dickson data sample—twice the relative frequency in the 
population—were decided by a one-vote margin. Cases with a 
high degree of consensus, which is to say those with majorities 
of eight or nine, are particularly underrepresented in Professor 
Dickson’s sample. Accounting for forty-three percent of the 
5777-case population, they are the modal outcome for the Court. 
61. Supreme Court Database, supra note 41. 
62. We follow existing work and coarsen issue area as follows: civil liberties cases 
involve criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and 
attorney-representation issues. Economics cases involve unions or economic activity. 
These mappings come from Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience,
AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 66, 70–74 (2000). 
63. The other remaining nine percent of cases were in the areas of federalism (five 





      05/06/2019   10:22:20
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B      05/06/2019   10:22:20
BLACKJOHNSONRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)  5/1/2019 11:16 AM 
248 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
However, they represent just twenty-two percent of cases 
included in the Dickson data. 
c. Case Media Salience 
Between 1946 and 1985, the New York Times provided 
front-page coverage (the conventional measure of case 
salience)64 for thirteen percent of the Court’s decisions. Yet 
sixty-two percent of the cases included in Professor Dickson’s 
sample received front-page treatment by the Times.
B. The Dickson Data Behind SCOTUS Notes 
To be clear, Professor Dickson was no fool in selecting 
cases to transcribe. The point of his volume was to uncover what 
had been said in cases that would be of potential interest to 
Supreme Court scholars and professors of constitutional law. 
Each of the areas we identify above as being “unrepresentative,” 
then, is likely the product of an intentional choice, one with 
which we have no quarrel.65 Yet, to the extent we are interested 
in a generalizable accounting of what goes on during 
conference, the corpus of cases in the Dickson data is limited in 
its ability to present such a picture. 
And, as for how the process of “normal science” is 
supposed to work, we seek to build on Professor Dickson’s work 
and on our preliminary efforts laid out above. To that end, we 
are in the late middle stages of a significant project that 
ultimately seeks to fill the critical void left by Professor Dickson 
and provide generalizable data on Supreme Court conference. In 
March 2016 we commenced our work on “Project SCOTUS 
Notes.” With generous financial support from the National 
64. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 62, at 72–81. 
65. We can appreciate that choice because our own teaching in constitutional law tends 
to focus on civil liberties cases, especially those that are controversial (such as cases that 
are decided by close final merits votes) and highly salient at the time they were decided. 
And, in that regard, the Dickson volume is an absolute—if tragically underutilized—gem 
of a resource. Professor Dickson provides an unprecedented glimpse into an environment 
that was previously inaccessible to scholars. His volume is full of rich anecdotes that we 
both routinely use in our courses. Most important, he demonstrates that much can be 
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Science Foundation, and significant in-kind assistance from 
Zooniverse,66 we will distribute a freely accessible and fully 
transcribed database of thousands of pages of conferences notes 
that span nearly half a century of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. 
Our work has involved (and continues to involve) a number 
of steps. To make our project tractable, we started by gathering 
all available conference notes from the archives of Justices who 
served on the Supreme Court between its 1946 and 1993 terms. 
We choose 1946 as the starting term as it is the first term for 
which systematic case-level data are available through the 
Supreme Court Database.67 The 1946 term also corresponds to 
the beginning of Fred M. Vinson’s tenure as Chief Justice. This 
is significant because the Vinson Court bridges the gap between 
the economic-heavy jurisprudence that characterized the Stone 
Court (1941 through 1946) and the civil-liberties-focused 
caseload of the Warren Court (1953 through 1969). We select 
1993 as our final term because it corresponds to the last term for 
which archival data are currently available (in the papers of 
Justice Blackmun).68 Across these forty-eight terms the Supreme 
Court issued a total of nearly 6900 decisions, decrees, or 
judgments that contained a total of almost forty million words. 
Our project’s goal is to provide scholars with the data necessary 
to better understand how these words originated. 
To accomplish this herculean task, we started by 
dispatching a number of research assistants to the Library of 
Congress Manuscript Reading Room in Washington, where they 
took tens of thousands of digital photographs of the conference 
notes contained in archives of several Justices.69 Although the 
66. See generally ZOONIVERSE.ORG, https://www.zooniverse.org/about (describing 
function of what it characterizes as “the world’s largest and most popular platform for 
people-powered research”). We provide a full description of our use of Zooniverse below. 
See text accompanying notes 73–80, infra.
67. Supreme Court Database, supra note 41. 
68. Since Justice Blackmun’s retirement in 1994, only five other Justices have left the 
Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist died in 2005, Justice O’Connor retired in 2006, Justice 
Souter retired in 2009, Justice Stevens retired in 2010, and Justice Kennedy retired in 2018. 
Our review of the access restrictions on their papers suggests that Blackmun’s will be the 
most current for some time to come. 
69. No graduate students were unduly harmed in the collection of these data, so far as 
we know. Lest you think we kept all the glory for ourselves, it is worth noting that we both 
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work is not physically laborious (like landscaping work), it is 
drudgery at its finest: sitting in a windowless room under the 
glow of fluorescent lights, eight hours a day, six days a week.70
Digital photographs in hand, our next step was to process, edit, 
and otherwise prepare these images for transcription. Combined, 
these first two steps took roughly a year and a half to 
accomplish. 
The third step in our process—and where we, as of spring 
2019 currently stand—is to convert digital images of conference 
notes to readable transcriptions. As the examples shown above 
in Figures 1A and 1B suggest, all of the conference notes 
contained in our data were written by hand. The Supreme Court, 
as an institution, has a penchant for being remarkably slow to 
embrace technological change.71 And, although there is 
relatively recent evidence of the Justices’ willingness to 
individually embrace technology in their day-to-day 
workflows,72 we know of no existing evidence that laptop or 
tablet computers have (yet) made their way into the hallowed 
conference room. Thankfully, we are not the first researchers to 
encounter copious quantities of scrawled writings by 
septuagenarians. 
Bridging the gap between raw image and digital text is 
therefore a daunting task that requires countless hours of human 
eyes and human hands to decipher and transcribe the 
handwriting. To make this feasible we partnered with 
Zooniverse, an NSF-supported online citizen-science 
NSF-sponsored research projects. We prefer to think of it as a rite of passage for judicial-
politics students. 
70. The idealized vision you have in your head of the Library of Congress from the 
National Treasure movies? That Manuscript Reading Room—the one of breathtaking 
beauty—is across the street in the Thomas Jefferson building. Whatever is left of your soul 
when you work in Supreme Court records as a graduate student is in the James Madison 
building, where the more prosaic manuscript reading rooms reside. 
71. See generally, e.g., Jerry Goldman, The U.S. Supreme Court and Information 
Technology: From Opacity to Transparency in Three Easy Steps, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
325 (2013). 
72. In a 2010 interview with C-SPAN, Justice Kagan remarked that she used a Kindle 
e-reader to review briefs. She similarly stated that Justice Scalia read briefs on an iPad. Jan 
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organization founded in 2007.73 Our SCOTUS Notes project is 
the first social science or law-related project represented on the 
platform, but data transcription has been part of the Zooniverse 
project portfolio since 2011, when it engaged approximately 
8000 volunteers to transcribe Greek papyri fragments one 
character at a time using an online keyboard.74 We chose the 
Zooniverse platform because it has demonstrated repeatedly that 
it can be harnessed with unprecedented success to overcome the 
previously insurmountable practical barriers to working with 
large amounts of unprocessed analog documents.75
We worked with Zooniverse to create SCOTUS Notes, an 
interactive website that enables volunteers to transcribe and 
decode the conference notes data we gathered.76 This platform 
was based on an already-existing transcription model that 
Zooniverse developed for Tate Britain, in which multiple users 
transcribe a line of text and their responses are automatically 
compared using a string-matrix algorithm to determine 
consensus.77 This algorithm minimizes the degree of editorial 
intervention, a bottleneck that has been identified as a major 
73. Project development at Zooniverse (CDI-II 0941610) is overseen by a collaborative 
effort among the University of Minnesota, Oxford University, and Chicago’s Adler 
Planetarium. Zooniverse is the largest academic crowdsourcing organization in operation, 
with over 400 academic, museum, and library partners around the world. Currently, more 
than 1.3 million registered volunteers participate in over thirty projects ranging from the 
sciences to the humanities.  
74. See www.ancientlives.org. 
75. In January 2014, Zooniverse partnered with the United Kingdom’s National 
Archives and the Imperial War Museum in London to transcribe British unit war diaries 
from World War I. Approximately 11,000 volunteers have processed over 100,000 pages 
of text, providing the equivalent of more than six years of full-time effort on the project in 
only eighteen months. See generally OPERATION WAR DIARY (n.d.), https://www.operation 
wardiary.org/). Most recently, in early March 2015, Zooniverse launched a transcription 
project called “Science Gossip” that, just four months later, had through the work of over 
4500 volunteers made roughly 230,000 total classifications. See generally SCIENCEGOSSIP 
(n.d.), https://www.operationwardiary.org/. 
76. SCOTUSNOTES: BEHIND THE SCENES AT SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE (n.d.), 
https://www.zooniverse.org/projects/zooniverse/scotus-notes-behind-the-scenes-at-supreme 
-court-conference. 
77.  For each transcribed line, the algorithm compares users’ transcriptions and when a 
predetermined subset of users has produced the same transcription, the system will log this 
consensus as well as each user’s individual transcription. There will, of course, be 
instances when consensus does not emerge. When this occurs, human editors, including us, 
our graduate students, and expert volunteers, will arbitrate between various users’ 
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stumbling block to producing good data efficiently in other 
transcription projects.78
The success of these efforts, of course, ultimately depends 
on our ability to identify, attract, engage, and retain audiences 
who will volunteer their time. As the numbers cited above make 
clear, Zooniverse has an excellent track record in this regard. 
And, at this point in our project we are happy to report that we 
have been broadly successful in engaging and attracting citizen 
scientists to collaborate with us on this project. As of early April 
2019, roughly 2900 unique users have completed nearly 140,000 
coding tasks for Project SCOTUS Notes.79 Beyond this, we have 
also, through the Talk Boards, actively engaged with our citizen 
scientists who are helping us understand Supreme Court 
conference. In the ten months since we launched Project 
SCOTUS Notes, there have been almost 1400 postings on our 
project’s boards. These posts provide a key opportunity for us to 
answer questions and learn from the dedicated individuals 
whose efforts make this project possible. 
Considering only sheer numbers, transcription represents 
the most challenging aspect of this project. However, we believe 
it is ultimately the dissemination of these data that is the most 
important component to ensuring that our data have the biggest 
and broadest impact possible. As we suggest above, a variety of 
audiences will be excited to “peek behind the curtain” and see 
what takes place during these secret conference meetings. Our 
overarching goal, then, is to provide the data in formats 
appropriate for such diverse audiences. In that sense, our 
approach is heavily influenced by the Supreme Court Database’s 
website,80 which is designed in a way that allows novices, 
experts, and everyone in between to use it. 
78.  Three specific Zooniverse projects (Ancient Lives, Galaxy Zoo, and Snapshot 
Serengeti) demonstrate that results from identifications made through this consensus 
algorithm of lay people (including children) are highly accurate. Previous scholarly 
research in political science has also suggested that it is an appropriate methodology for 
classifying data like the Justices’ conference notes. See Kenneth Benoit, Drew Conway, 
Benjamin E. Lauderdale, Michel Laver, & Slava Mikhaylov, Crowd-Sourced Text 
Analysis: Reproducible and Agile Production of Political Data, 110 AM. POLITICAL SCI.
REV. 278 (2016). 
79. As of this writing, the transcription is only about ten percent complete. Beginning in 
early 2019, we will set volunteers to transcribing another 29,800 images. We are confident 
that we can have this done within a year’s time. 
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Once completed, SCOTUS Notes will allow users to see 
(and download) the basic digital reproduction of the conference 
notes as well as the Zooniverse-generated transcriptions of them. 
It will also be fully searchable, both in terms of accessing a 
specific case (Roe v. Wade, for example) or by the content of 
what a Justice said during conference (“privacy” or “viable,” for 
example). Because our data will be linked with the Supreme 
Court Database, users will also be able to further restrict their 
browsing or searching to any variable in it.81 Pages for each case 
will be linked with any other available data about the case, 
including summaries, briefs, transcripts and audio of oral 
argument, and, of course, the Court’s final opinion. 
We suspect the majority of users of our data will interact 
with them through this format. Researchers and scholars, 
however, are more likely to want to obtain large quantities of 
data that they can subsequently analyze on their own. To that 
end, we will also provide machine-readable text files that 
contain all transcribed content across the entire collection—or 
any user-defined subset of it. We envision users invoking a 
variety of programming languages (such as R or Python) and 
computer programs (such as LIWC) to parse and analyze the 
files using any one of a number of methods from computational 
linguistics.82 These will be made available for bulk download 
from the SCOTUS Notes Archive. We will also generate and 
provide analysis-ready files that contain quantitative data about 
the conference data for each case (how many lines of notes were 
present, for example). Users will be able to easily merge these 
files with other data for their specific research needs. 
81. For example, a researcher could look at all conference notes in privacy cases (by 
using “issueArea = 5” when searching in the Database) or, if searching more specifically, 
will be able to restrict their searches to privacy cases involving abortion rights (by using 
“issue = 50020” when searching in the Database). See Supreme Court Database, supra
note 41. 
82. See, e.g., Kevin M. Quinn, Burt L. Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael H. Crespin, 
& Dragomir R. Radev, How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and 
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VII. THE FUTURE INTELLECTUAL MERIT OF STUDYING
SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE
As to what future research needs might be, we believe our 
data on Supreme Court conference will enable scholars to make 
theoretical, empirical, and substantive advances in how we 
understand the Supreme Court, judicial decisionmaking, and the 
development of law. The single most valuable aspect of these 
data is their ability to provide detailed information on a Justice’s 
preliminary legal and policy positions in a case. As we noted 
above, the only existing systematic data provide information 
about how each Justice voted in terms of case disposition 
(reverse or a rm) but say nothing about why a Justice voted in 
a particular way. This distinction is important because, for the 
Supreme Court, “law is found primarily in legal opinions, not 
divined from the outcomes of cases,” which means that it is “the 
opinions that matter most.”83
Access to the Supreme Court’s final written opinions is not, 
of course, anything new. However, since the behavioral 
revolution in political science, and the shift away from 
formalism/traditionalism approaches, scholars have been 
reluctant to take such documents at face value. The Court’s final 
written opinions do not spring fully formed from the head of 
Zeus. Rather, they start with the views expressed by Justices 
during conference and evolve based on their interactions with 
one another during the opinion-writing process now referred to 
by political scientists as the “collegial game.”84
We believe the metaphor is particularly apt. The game truly 
begins when the Justices, much like poker players, sit around a 
table and sequentially reveal their hands (their views and 
preferences) to their colleagues. To date, however, this part of 
the process has been noticeably neglected by scholars who study 
opinion writing and bargaining. Instead, existing accounts focus 
83. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 266
(2006). 
84. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 25, at 8 (coining the term in 
noting that “[b]ecause outcomes on the Supreme Court depend on forging a majority 
coalition that for most cases must consist of at least five justices, there is good reason to 
expect that final Court opinions will be the product of a collaborative process, what we call 
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on the role of political (ideology, for example) or contextual 
(case importance, for example) factors and ignore the role of law 
and legal discussion. Collecting and systematizing what happens 
during conference, then, represents a major leap forward in 
fleshing out how judicial opinions are crafted and what drives 
the often consequential policies they contain. Making these data 
widely available will therefore transform our understanding of 
the Supreme Court as both a political and legal institution. 
Beyond breaking new ground, conference data will also 
allow for fresh and improved insight about a number of broad 
questions. Indeed, the two existing studies to use conference 
data demonstrate that this is possible.  Professors Knight and 
Epstein were among the first to contribute to a now ample (and 
growing) literature about how law constrains Supreme Court 
decisionmaking.85 Professor Johnson’s study was the first to 
establish that oral argument is not merely a dog-and-pony show 
but an important aspect of the Court’s decisionmaking process.86
Like the data behind these ground-breaking studies, we 
anticipate that our SCOTUS Notes data will help scholars 
generate new knowledge in several areas. 
First, consider the factors that may lead Justices to change 
votes during their decisionmaking process. Since Professor 
Howard’s initial 1968 study,87 scholars have sought to 
understand when and why Justices change their votes after 
conference but before they publicly announce a decision. 
However, each of these studies focuses exclusively on changes 
in dispositional votes.88 Our data will allow scholars to evaluate 
this topic in light of something one might call legal fluidity or, 
more explicitly, changes in Justices’ substantive arguments as 
they work towards a final opinion. In so doing, researchers will 
be able to dramatically expand upon and potentially reevaluate 
conventional wisdom that has existed for half a century. 
85. See Knight & Epstein, supra note 5. 
86. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 38.
87. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 65 AM. POLITICAL 
SCI. REV. 43 (Mar. 1968). 
88. See generally, e.g., MALTZMAN & WAHLBECK, supra note 12; Eve M. Ringsmuth, 
Amanda C. Bryan, & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting Fluidity and Oral Argument on the U.S. 
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Opinion writing and, in particular, preemptive 
accommodation is a second area in which our data will generate 
new knowledge. Professors Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 
define this concept as how majority opinion authors attempt to 
shore up support from Justices in the conference majority by 
incorporating their positions into initial opinion drafts.89 To test 
their account, however, Professor Maltzman and his colleagues 
rely upon a coarse surrogate: the amount of time between when 
a majority opinion author receives an opinion assignment and 
when she circulates the first draft of it to the Court. Though the 
proxy is certainly plausible, our data will enable a more direct 
measure by comparing the conference statements of each Justice 
in the initial majority with the first circulated draft written by the 
opinion author. This type of analysis will take the field away 
from its conventional focus on votes and bring it much closer to 
understanding the role law actually plays in how the Justices 
decide. 
Data resulting from our project will also contribute to 
important and on-going theoretical debates. Consider the 
question of who “controls” the Court’s majority opinion. For 
decades scholars followed Professor Black90 and conceptualized 
decisionmaking on the Court as taking place in a unidimensional 
space, where the preferences of the median Justice prevailed. 
That account has, in recent years, come under increasing 
empirical and theoretical scrutiny.91 Professors Bonneau and his 
colleagues,92 and Professors Lax and Cameron,93 through 
separate theoretical approaches, argue that majority opinion 
authors exert “agenda control” on opinion content. More 
89.  MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 25, at 96 (explaining that “if 
opinion authors know that their colleagues are unlikely to sign an opinion that does not 
reflect their preferences, authors may try to write an opinion comporting with the 
discussion of the case at conference and thus satisfy their brethren with the first draft”). 
90. Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POLITICAL 
ECON. 23 (1948). 
91. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme Court’s Many 
Median Justices, 106 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 847 (2012). 
92. Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court,
AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 890 (2007). 
93.  Lax & Cameron, supra note 34, at 278–79 (referring to agenda control as a factor 
in the Chief Justice’s assignment of opinions and discussing theories of agenda control by 
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recently, Professor Carrubba and his colleagues94 suggest it is 
the median Justice within the majority coalition whose 
preferences reign supreme. 
While the foundation of support for the median-voter 
model has mostly eroded, uncertainty remains about which new 
perspective is best suited to take its place. Lack of detailed data 
is one of the main reasons scholars have not settled on a more 
definitive answer to this important question because “[d]irect 
empirical tests of the bargaining model require better or more 
nuanced data on the policy content and craftsmanship of 
opinions than are presently available.”95 To state the obvious, 
the first necessary step in identifying whose views are influential
is to measure those views. The data we propose to gather 
through SCOTUS Notes will allow scholars to accomplish 
exactly that. In fact, the conference notes will o er evidence of 
what each Justice spoke about during conference, which will 
make it possible to determine whose views prevail in the final 
opinion.
To provide an answer to the question of opinion control is 
to do much more than merely resolve a theoretical debate among 
scholars. Rather, this question speaks to how researchers 
substantively understand and think about the inner workings of 
the Court. There are profound practical implications for scholars 
as well. Studies from across the entire spectrum of American 
politics routinely seek to put the Supreme Court in a policy 
space where it can be compared to other actors. This includes 
the federal courts of appeals and federal district courts,96 state 
courts,97 and other political institutions, including Congress,98
the President,99 and the federal bureaucracy.100 Doing so 
94. Carrubba et al., supra note 34. 
95. Lax & Cameron, supra note 34, at 297.
96. E.g., Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Scott 
Comparato, Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J.
POLITICAL SCI. 891 (2010). 
97. E.g., Benjamin Kassow, Donald R. Songer & Michael P. Fix, The Influence of 
Precedent on State Supreme Courts, 65 POLITICAL RES. Q. 372 (2012). 
98. E.g., Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of 
Powers, 95 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 361 (2001). 
99. E.g., CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE 
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requires knowing where the Court belongs, which is something 
scholars will be able to better accomplish with the explicit 
substantive legal and policy data we will gather at SCOTUS 
Notes.
Finally, at the most basic substantive level, our project will 
make broadly available information and data previously 
accessible only to individuals with the resources to travel to an 
archive. With the exception of the small number of cases 
transcribed by Professor Dickson,101 information about the legal 
positions of Justices in more than 6500 cases are ignored by 
history and scholars alike. When these notes are made available, 
researchers will be able to utilize them to provide careful, in-
depth analyses of specific cases, Justices, issue areas, and eras of 
Court decisionmaking. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Much of the work done by the United States Supreme 
Court is shrouded in absolute secrecy. We propose to pull back 
the curtain and make public nearly fifty years of previously 
unexamined discussions among Justices on our nation’s highest 
court. By gathering, transcribing, and coding a half century of 
Supreme Court conference notes, SCOTUS Notes will enhance 
scholarly understanding of what takes place during what is 
arguably the most important step of the Court’s decisionmaking 
process. The conference vote determines the initial disposition 
of the case which, in turn, determines who has the power to 
assign the author of the majority opinion. Further, these 
discussions set the initial agenda—the frame through which the 
Justices craft their substantive legal and policy arguments in the 
opinion. Despite the importance of conference, existing 
scholarship generally ignores the substance of these 
proceedings. The work we propose will rectify this major 
shortfall, engage the public in unprecedented ways, and 
fundamentally transform our understanding of how the nation’s 
highest court decides. 
100. E.g., Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis & 
David C. Nixon, Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, 
Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 341 (2012). 
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